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1 March 1966

OCI No. 0862/66

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## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

### REVIEW OF INSURGENCY PROBLEMS



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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Office of Current Intelligence

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REVIEW OF INSURGENCY PROBLEMS



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Office of Current Intelligence  
1 March 1966

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Review of Insurgency Problems

1. Thailand

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On 21 February the government announced the formation of a political action committee for the northeast. The committee, which will operate under the Counter Subversion Operations Command, is designed to handle political aspects of the subversion problem including regaining the loyalty of villagers in subverted areas and the punishment of ineffective local officials. The new committee's program will address itself to the political vacuum in the countryside which provides the opportunity for the subversives


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3. Guatemala

Communist-inspired violence is likely to follow the elections scheduled for 6 March.

Communists and other extremist groups may go into the streets to fight, claiming that there has been fraud in the electoral process.

Although the Guatemalan security forces are capable of handling limited trouble, they would be hard pressed to control a situation involving large-scale terrorist activities.


4. Colombia

Public demonstrations protesting the killing of Camilo Torres on 15 February during a clash between his guerrilla band and an army patrol have been controlled by the police. The small scale of the protests indicates that Torres' brief career as a guerrilla failed to generate any considerable support either for himself or for the Army of National Liberation (ELN).

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